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SEYLA BENHABIB
THE STRUGGLE OVER CULTURE: 
EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY 
IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE.
In this lecture I would like to examine the role of discourses of 
cultural and religious difference and of the fl uid boundaries between 
culture and religion, as they mark contemporary political confl icts. In 
particular, I want to investigate how the integration of so-called “Is-
lamic” cultural and religious differences is defi ning the dialectic of 
inclusion and exclusion within the European public sphere. While the 
actuality of these concerns can hardly be debated – they confront us 
everyday as news about bombings in Madrid or London, car burnings 
and violent confrontations with the police on the streets of Paris – 
their philosophical import have not been properly examined1.
Increasingly in todayʼs world, we are experiencing the growing 
antagonism between religious and ethno-cultural differences and the 
sphere of the political in ways that are painfully reminiscent of Eu-
ropeʼs “Wars of Religion”. The representation of cultural and reli-
gious difference in the public sphere has become a central political 
struggle in all western democracies. The «clash of civilizations», a 
term which Samuel Huntington has made so popular, is not only out-
side state boundaries; it is within them as well. In particular, wom-
enʼs bodies have become the site of symbolic confrontations between 
a re-essentialized understanding of religious and cultural difference 
1  This lecture draws on my work from recent years, during which I have examined citizenship, 
multiculturalism, migration, and womenʼs issues within the context of the global developments 
and with specifi c reference to the European Union. See my Transformation of Citizenship. Dilem-
mas of the Nation-State in an Era of Globalization. The Spinoza Lectures, Van Gorcum, Amster-
dam 2001; Ead., The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 2002; Ead., The Rights of Others. Aliens, Citizens and Residents. The 
John Seeley Memorial Lectures, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.
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and the forces of state power – whether in its civic-republican, lib-
eral-democratic or multicultural-communitarian form. “The scarf af-
fair”, or “lʼaffaire du foulard”, or sometimes as it is referred to as “la 
voile”, in France, Germany and Turkey, will constitute my reference 
point here.
I begin by examining the new discourse concerning religion in the 
public square in the context of the secularization hypothesis. Then I 
turn to contemporary ideologies of cultural difference, and examine, 
as a next step, the position of discourses about women and their 
prominence in intercultural evaluations. The “scarf affair” in France 
and the case of the German-Afghani teacher, Farashda Ludin, consti-
tute my concrete reference points. I conclude with a theoretical po-
litical framework, which I call democratic iterations, to conceptual-
ize the new forms of contestation around equality and diversity.
1. The End of the Secularization Hypothesis
Since Max Weberʼs essay Wissenschaft als Beruf (1919), it has 
been axiomatic that modernity is characterized by Entzauberung, by 
the loss of magic in everyday world and the rationalized differentia-
tion (Ausdifferenzierung) from one another of the spheres of science, 
religion, law, aesthetics and philosophy. Max Weber was giving ex-
pression thereby to a widely held view since the Enlightenment, that 
the spread of knowledge and science would mean not only «holding 
religion within the bounds of reason», as Kant thought, but dispens-
ing with religion altogether in the name of modern reason, as Feuer-
bach, Marx and Nietzsche postulated. Modernization would mean 
secularization, whether in the form of an ideology critique which be-
gan with the critique of religion as the chief hindrance on the way to 
an emancipated society, or as secularization in the form of “loss of 
magic” in a scientifi c-technological rationalized everyday world.
Karl Löwith and Hans Blumenberg have already reminded us of 
the theological sources of Enlightenmentʼs own belief in the secu-
larization hypothesis: the idea of a united mankind, capable of cu-
mulative learning and progressing toward a common Enlightenment, 
has its sources in religiously inspired salvation myths2. The Enlight-
enment was not beyond theology but based on theological premises 
2  K. Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1949; H. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern 
Age. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, trans. by R. M. Wallace, MIT Press, Bos-
ton 1983.
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of a Heilsgeschichte. And even early sociological students of mo-
dern societies, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, pointed out in mid-
nineteenth-century that the great modern experiment with democracy 
required religious foundations. Tocqueville noted that the most egali-
tarian of modern societies of his time, the United States, remained 
deeply religious. The secularization hypothesis always had its de-
tractors.
Today we are experiencing the world-wide growth of religious 
fundamentalisms and the intense challenge to one crucial aspect of 
the modernization process, in particular the separation between reli-
gion and politics; or between theological truths and political certi-
tudes. The ever fragile walls of separation between religion and the 
public square have become increasingly porous. Certainly, this phe-
nomenon is most strikingly observed with the rise of political Islam, 
which challenges not only the separation of religion and politics but 
threatens the very boundaries of Islamic nation-states altogether in 
the name of “Dar-ul-Islam” (the domain of Islam) to prevail over 
“Dar-ul-Harb” (the domain of the infi dels); however, since the Nine-
teen-seventies Jewish and Christian fundamentalisms have gained 
more and more adherents as well. What is remarkable about these 
movements is their poverty in terms of doctrinal and theological in-
novations when contrasted to their attractiveness for their followers 
in terms of securing collective identities. I would dare say that, since 
the Liberation Theology movements of Latin America, half a century 
ago, we have not seen an authentic theological renovation of core 
religious doctrines; instead, what we see are the manifestations of 
religiosity as an identity project and the increasingly blurred lines 
between religious concerns of faith and ethno-cultural preoccupations 
with identity. It is this blurring of the line between religion and cul-
ture, and the diffi culty of differentiating among them, which concerns 
me in this lecture.
Differentiating the religious from the cultural is signifi cant be-
cause of the commitment of liberal democracies to uphold the funda-
mental rights of freedom of conscience, expression and association. 
Recall some contemporary controversies was Salman Rushdieʼs Sa-
tanic Verses an expression of religious apostasy, as devout Muslim 
communities claimed, or was it an expression of artistic freedom and 
cultural irony, as many liberals and democrats argued? Could it have 
been both? Is wearing the “hijab” by observant Muslim women a 
religiously mandated duty or a cultural dress code which shows great 
variation in different Islamic traditions? Is polygamy religiously 
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sanctifi ed by the Koran? And what about female genital mutilation? 
What religious basis, if any, is there for this practice?
A principal reason for this blurring of the lines is a sociological 
one which I have characterized in other works as “reverse globaliza-
tion”3. The distinction between the cultural and the religious as well 
as the identifi cation of actions and customs as being one or the other 
is occurring against the background of the history and experience of 
colonialism and of the Westʼs encounter with the rest. Whereas at one 
time it was the historical experience of western colonialism in facing 
its cultural and religious “others” that forced European political 
thought to clarify and solidify the line between the religious and the 
cultural, today it is mass migration from Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East to the shores of resource-rich liberal democracies such as the 
EU, the USA, Canada and Australia that is leading to the reframing 
of the distinction between the cultural and the religious. Under condi-
tions of immigration, a destabilization of identities and traditions is 
taking place and tradition is being “reinvented”.
A historical example may illustrate for us what Eric Hobsbawm 
has presciently named «the invention of tradition». The history of the 
Indian custom of “widow burning” – sati – is instructive here. Ac-
cording to sati, a widowed wife emolates herself by ascending the 
burning funeral pyre of her husband. In her analysis of the politics of 
tradition formation, the Indian feminist philosopher, Uma Narayan, 
puzzles over «how and why this particular practice, marginal to many 
Hindu communities let alone Indian ones, came to be regarded as a 
central Indian tradition»4. Her answer, based on recent historiography 
of colonial India, is that the meaning as well as status of sati as a 
tradition, emerged out of negotiations between British colonials and 
local Indian elites. British colonial administrators who were driven, 
on the one hand, by their own moral and civilizational revulsion 
when confronted with this practice, were, on the other hand, equally 
concerned that their intervention in outlawing this practice should not 
lead to political unrest. British colonial offi cials investigated the sta-
tus of sati as a «religious practice», assuming that if it had religious 
sanction, it would be unwise to abolish it; if it did not, then the aboli-
tion could be approved of by the local elites themselves5. To deter-
mine whether a practice had a religious basis, in turn, meant fi nding 
3  Cfr. S. Benhabib, The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, chap. 1.
4  U. Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third-World Feminism, 
Routledge, New York 1997, p. 61.
5  Ivi, p. 62.
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a justifi cation for it in religious scripture. Reasoning analogically that 
in Hinduism the relationship of scripture to practice was like that in 
Christianity, British colonial powers then trusted accounts of docu-
ments produced by Indian pundits (religious scholars) codifying in 
effect the interpretation of tradition. Given that Hinduism, unlike 
Christianity, does not have a core spiritual text, «[…] the question of 
where to look for such scriptural evidence was hardly self-evident. 
The interpretative task was not made any easier by the fact that there 
seemed to be few, if any, clear and unambiguous textual endorsement 
of sati»6. What emerged at the end of a long historical process of 
cultural interventions and negotiations was the ironing out of incon-
sistencies in the account of local elites about the various myths sur-
rounding the fi gure of sati, the quasi-codifi cation of religious stories 
in relation to existing practices, and above all the homogenization of 
discrepancies in local Hindu traditions which varied not only from 
region to region but among the various castes as well.
Cooked in the cauldron of the religious wars in Europe, which pit-
ted Protestants against Catholics, Anglicans against both, sectarian 
and millenarian movements against all for several centuries, mem-
bers of the British colonial administration sought to apply the lessons 
of religious tolerance as practiced in the modern secular state to the 
Indian case. As long as a practice was considered central to oneʼs 
religion, a certain amount of tolerance was to be shown toward it. 
But what if the practice at hand was not religious but merely cultural, 
in the sense that members of the same religion felt free to engage in 
it or not, depending on other factors? The presumption of the colo-
nial administrators was that culture as opposed to religion needed to 
be protected less against intervention and legislation, particularly if 
the practices at hand were considered odious and offensive to human 
dignity, in accordance with the self-understanding of the majority.
Most liberal democracies down to our own days operate with some 
version of this distinction between cultural and religious practices, 
and between central and subsidiary practices of a religion. My point 
is not to challenge these distinctions; what I want to stress is an in-
sights which derives from Ludwig Wittgensteinʼs epistemology but 
which I want to use in the current context: very often we do not 
know what type of a practice the practice at hand is for we do not 
share a common meaning of the disputed practice itself. Is it religion, 
is it culture, or is it morality? What if it is all of these and may be 
6  Ivi, p. 200.
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none and what if its meaning shifts and changes as a result of social 
and cultural interactions across time and within shared space? I will 
argue that this is precisely what is taking place around the practice of 
“veiling” in different communities of Muslim women who engage in 
this practice in countries of immigration as well as in their own soci-
eties. In other words, the practice itself is being resignifi ed.
2. Contemporary Ideologies of Cultural Difference
Contemporary ideologies of cultural difference ignore both the 
contested boundaries between religious and cultural practices, as well 
as the fl uid resignifi cations currently taking place among migrant, 
third-world communities in Europe and elsewhere. Instead, a re-es-
sentialized discourse of the cultural cum religious cum anthropologi-
cal difference is dominating the public-political vocabulary: thus, it is 
not contemporary Turkeyʼs failure to live up to the Copenhagen cri-
teria in its search for candidacy to enter the EU that is lamented but 
whether the EU can accommodate a majority Muslim country with 
70 million inhabitants. Thus, it is not the deplorable marginalization, 
degradation and social exclusion of immigrant youth of Islamic and 
African origin by French society that is lamented but the fact that 
these youths come from families which are supposed to “practice 
polygamy”, and are therefore not “normal” in the sense that the 
French bourgeoisie recognizes. As the banlieues of Paris were burn-
ing, the question of Islamic polygamy, certainly which should be of 
concern to all of us, was paraded as the proximate cause of events 
which could have been explained much more simply and truthfully 
by examining inner city riots in the USA in the late Nineteen-sixties 
among urban, marginalized, mostly African-American youth. The 
suggestion that polygamic family practices of these youth accounted 
for their actions pointed the fi nger not at socio-economic factors but 
rather at cultural difference as the explainans for all social confl ict. 
What was once the romantic multicultural discourse of “difference”, 
common to the western Left, is now deployed by the European right. 
I want to briefl y analyze the philosophical as well as social-scientifi c 
presuppositions of this language of cultural difference.
Whether conservative or progressive, such attempts share a number 
of faulty epistemic premises: 1) that cultures are clearly delineable 
wholes; 2) that there are smooth overlaps between cultures and 
groups, in the sense that a non-controversial description of the cul-
ture of a human group is possible; and 3) even if cultures and groups 
do not stand in a one-to-one correspondence with one another, and 
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even if there is more than one culture within a human group, and 
more than one human group which may possess the same cultural 
traits, this does not pose problems for politics or policy. Taken to-
gether these assumptions form what I will call the “reductionist socio-
logy of culture”. In the words of Terence Turner, this view «risks 
essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or 
race; it risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasizing 
their boundedness and distinctness; it risks overemphasizing the in-
ternal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimize 
repressive demands for communal conformity; and by treating cul-
tures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways 
that put them beyond the reach of critical analysis»7.
For the participants of the culture, by contrast, their traditions and 
stories, rituals as well as tools, material living conditions as well as 
symbols, are experienced through contested and contestable narrative 
accounts. From within the culture itself, a culture does not and need 
not appear as a whole; rather it forms a horizon, which recedes fur-
ther and further each time one approaches it.
Why does culture present itself through narratively contested ac-
counts? For two principal reasons. First, human actions and relations 
are formed through a double hermeneutic. We identify what we do 
through an account of what we do; words and deeds are equiprimor-
dial, in the sense that almost all socially signifi cant human action – 
beyond scratching oneʼs nose – is identifi ed as a certain type of do-
ing through the accounts which agents as well as others give of that 
doing. This is true even when, and especially when, there is disa-
greement between the doer and the observer. Second, human actions 
and interactions are not only constituted through narratives which 
together form a «web of narratives» (Hannah Arendt), but human 
beings always also have an evaluative stance toward their doings. 
There are second-order narratives that entail a certain normative at-
titude toward the fi rst-order narrative accounts of human deeds. Hu-
man beings live in an evaluative universe. What we call culture is 
the horizon formed by these evaluative stances through which the 
infi nite chain of space-time sequences is demarcated into “good” 
and “bad”, “holy” and “profane”, “pure” and “impure”. Cultures are 
formed through binarisms.
7  T. Turner, Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is Anthropology that Multiculturalism 
should be Mindful of it?, «Cultural Anthropology», vol. 8, n. 4, 1993, A. S. Anagnost (ed.), Pub-
lished for “The Society for Cultural Anthropology”, University of California Press, Oakland 
(CA), p. 412.
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We should view human cultures as the constant creation, recrea-
tion, and negotiation of imaginary boundaries between “us” and 
“them”, “we” and the “other(s)”. The other is always also within us 
and is one of us. The self is a self only because it distinguishes itself 
from an imaginary “other”. Struggles for recognition, among indi-
viduals and groups, are struggles to negate this status of “otherness”, 
insofar as otherness is taken to involve disrespect, contempt, domina-
tion and inequality. Individuals and groups struggle to attain respect 
and self-worth, freedom and equality while also retaining some sense 
of selfhood. Whether in the psyche of the individual or in the life of 
nations, to let the other be in his or her difference while recognizing 
his/her fundamental human equality and dignity, is one of the most 
diffi cult achievements of human interaction – a task at which, more 
often than not, one fails.
3. Sexual Difference and Cultural Diversity
Why is it then that sexual difference plays such an important role 
in the demarcation of cultural differences? Why is it that cultural di-
versity is often inscribed within the language of sexual difference?
The sphere of sexual and reproductive lives is a central focus of 
most human cultures8. The regulation of these functions forms the 
dividing line between nature and culture: all animal species need to 
mate and reproduce in order to survive, but the regulation of mating, 
sexuality, and reproduction in accordance with «kinship patterns» is, 
as Claude Levi-Strauss argued in The Elementary Structures of Kin-
ship, the line that separates fusis from nomos. Women and their bo-
dies are the symbolic-cultural site upon which human societies in-
script their moral order. In virtue of their capacity for sexual repro-
duction, women mediate between nature and culture, between the 
animal species to whom we all belong and the symbolic orders which 
make us into cultured beings.
Since Simone de Beauvoirʼs The Second Sex feminist theory has 
dissected why this function of women as mediators between nature 
and culture also makes them the object of longing and fear, desire 
and fl ight. The passages in and out of human life are usually marked 
by the presence of the female: always and inevitably in the case of 
birth, usually, but not necessarily in the case of death, since male 
8  S. Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?”, in J. Cohen-M. Howard-M. C. Nussbaum 
(eds.), Is multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1999, pp. 
12-13. Si veda la trad. it. di questo saggio in questo numero di «Post-fi losofi e», pp. 97-113.
Seyla Benhabib 85
magicians, priests and shamans can also play a signifi cant role in the 
death ceremony. The female of the species who presides over these 
functions thereby controls moments of greatest vulnerability in hu-
man life: when we enter life we are helpless as infants and when we 
leave it, we are equally helpless in the face of death. Intercultural 
confl icts, which challenge the symbolic order of these spheres, be-
cause they delve into the earliest and deepest recesses of the psyche, 
are likely to generate the most intense emotional responses. Thus the 
loss of oneʼs culture, cultural uprooting and the mixture of cultures 
are often presented in sexualized terms: oneʼs culture has been 
«raped», say primordialists, by the new and foreign customs and 
habits which have been imposed upon one; cultural intermixture is 
very often described as mongrolization or mestizaje. The use of these 
metaphors is not accidental: fundamentalist movements know very 
well the deep recesses of psychic vulnerability into which they tap 
in doing so.
These interconnections between psychic identity, the practices of 
the private sphere and cultural difference, assume a new confi gura-
tion in modern liberal-democracies. These societies demarcate the 
private from the public along the following lines. In the genealogy of 
liberal political thought the distinction between the “public” and “pri-
vate” spheres has referred to at least four domains. Down to our own 
days, the status of cultural and religious differences and the articula-
tion of sexual difference in the public sphere of liberal democracies 
take place within this conceptual horizon.
In its most prominent sense, “the private” refers to the domain of 
the household and family life. The autonomy of the liberal subject is 
deciding upon whom to marry; the inner psychic life of the family; 
the regulation of sexuality within it are considered “private” matters. 
Of course, matters are never that simple, and the line between the 
public and the private is always contested. From the standpoint of the 
liberal state, the family is a public institution in which practices go-
verning marriage and divorce are defi ned and regulated by political 
as well as legal norms. The state confers fi scal and economic status upon 
the family in that it defi nes the tax status of those who are considered 
family members; in not recognizing same sex unions as marriages, 
the state also upholds a specifi c conception of the family. Viewed as 
an institution within the modern state then, there is nothing “private” 
about the family.
The second most important sense of the “private” sphere is the 
right of citizens to their liberty of conscience. In the words of John 
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Rawls, the liberal state is based on the assumption that citizens are 
moral persons who can form their own sense of the good and also 
engage in cooperative public activities of justice in pursuing their 
various life-projects, whether these are characterized by religion, aes-
thetics, science, or culture. In this domain as well lines separating 
religion from the state; aesthetics from politics have always hotly 
contested.
The third sense of the “private” refers to the “civil space”: certain 
forms of association, such as clubs, religious institutions, educational 
facilities, cultural and scientifi c organizations are considered “pri-
vate”, in the sense that they pursue shared goals of citizens, under-
stood as individuals with diverse confl icting interests in an active 
civil society. The state ought not dictate the content of these activities 
nor regulate the internal constitutions of these organizations. Here as 
well, the line between the “civil” and “the political”, the “private 
organizations” and “public interests” is subject to constant negotia-
tion and rearticulation.
The fourth meaning of the private is that of the economic sphere, 
or to use Hegelian language, of «the system of needs». The modern 
capitalist commodity economy is based upon the so-called free ex-
change of goods among legally equal property owners in the market 
place. Since the Nineteenth-century most social movements for jus-
tice have contested, in this domain as well, the “privacy” of market 
relations and of the consequences of economic laws.
The “public/private” distinction is both pivotal yet highly contro-
versial in all liberal-democracies. Many political disagreements 
among citizens are about the limits of state interference in all these 
private spheres or again, about the desirability of state interference 
and state regulation within them.
It is possible to distinguish broadly between a “civic republican”, 
a “liberal-democratic” and “multicultural-communitarian” manner of 
conceptualizing the relationship between religious difference and the 
political community and the further articulations of the public and 
private spheres. With the “civic republican” model I mean the French 
principle of “laïcité” and the Turkish principle of “laiklik”, which 
was modeled on the French one. In this model the public sphere is to 
maintain a strict removal from all religious and ethnic symbols, re-
legating them to the private sphere. With the “liberal-democratic” 
model I have in mind a plethora of institutional arrangements, princi-
pally characteristic of Anglo-American and Protestant countries, in 
which the boundaries between the public and the private articulation 
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of difference, as well as that between religion and politics is porous, 
pragmatically defi ned and always contested. With the “multi-cultural 
and communitarian” model, I mean in the fi rst place countries such 
as Israel and India, in which civil-personal rights, such as marriage, 
divorce, alimony, and inheritance, are distinct for each religious cum 
ethno-cultural group and in which the public sphere is segmented for 
each group and refl ects the core differences without absorbing them 
in a common public political identity.
The “struggle over cultural identities” and the position of women 
within different religious and cultural communities are pushing the 
limits of established legal, political, cultural and discursive lines se-
parating the public from the private and signaling new rearticulations. 
I want to look at the ongoing controversy in France, Turkey and Ger-
many about “lʼaffaire du foulard” – the so-called “scarf affair”– in 
this context.
4. “LʼAffaire du Foulard”
“Lʼ affaire du foulard” refers to a long and drawn out set of public 
confrontations which began in France in 1989 with the expulsion 
from their school in Creil (Oise) of three scarf-wearing Muslim girls 
and continued to the mass exclusion of 23 Muslim girls from their 
schools in November 1996 upon the decision of the Conseil dʼEtat9. 
Finally, after nearly a decade of confrontations, the French National 
Assembly passed a law in March 2004 with a great majority banning 
not only the wearing of the “scarf”, now interestingly referred to no 
longer as “le foulard”, but instead as “la voile”, but the bearing of all 
«ostentation signs of religious belonging in the public sphere». The 
Commision headed by Bernard Stasi and presented to the President 
of the Republic, considers the wearing of the scarf as part of a grow-
ing political threat of Islam to the values of “laïcité”.
Let me introduce another note of terminological clarifi cation fi rst: 
the practice of veiling among Muslim women is a complex institu-
tion that exhibits great variety across many Muslim countries. The 
terms chador, hijab, niqab, foulard refer to distinct items of clothing 
which are worn by Muslim women coming from different Muslim 
communities: for example, the chador is essentially Iranian and re-
9  My discussion of these incidents relies primarily upon two sources: F. Gaspard-F. Khos-
rokhavar, Le Foulard et la Republique, Decouverte, Paris 1995, and an excellent seminar paper by 
M. Brun-Rovet, A perspective on the multiculturalism debate: «lʼaffaire foulard» and laïcité in 
France, 1989-1999, submitted to Benhabibʼs seminar on “Nations, States and Citizens”, Harvard 
University, Department of Government 2000.
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fers to the long black robe and head scarf worn in a rectangular man-
ner around the face; the niqab is a veil that covers the eyes and the 
mouth and only leaves the nose exposed; it may or may not be worn 
in conjunction with the chador. Most Muslim women from Turkey 
are likely to wear either long overcoats and a foulard (a head scarf) 
or a carsaf (a black garment which most resembles the chador). 
These items of clothing have a symbolic function within the Muslim 
community itself: women coming from different countries signal to 
one another their ethnic and national origins through their clothing, 
as well as signifying their distance or proximity to tradition in doing 
so. The brighter the colors of their overcoats and scarves – bright 
blue, green, beige, lilac as opposed to brown, grey, navy and of 
course, black – and the more fashionable their cuts and material by 
western standards, all the more can we assume the distance from Is-
lamic orthodoxy of the women who wear them. Seen from the out-
side, however, this complex semiotic of dress codes gets reduced to 
one or two items of clothing which then assume the function of cru-
cial symbols of complex negotiations among Muslim religious and 
cultural identities and western cultures.
The French sociologists Gaspard and Khosrokhavar capture these 
set of complex symbolic negotiations as follows: «[The veil] mirrors 
in the eyes of the parents and the grandparents the illusions of conti-
nuity whereas it is a factor of discontinuity; it makes possible the 
transition to otherness (modernity), under the pretext of identity (tra-
dition); it creates the sentiment of identity with the society of origin 
whereas its meaning is inscribed within the dynamic of relations with 
the receiving society, […] it is the vehicle of the passage to modernity 
within a promiscuity which confounds traditional distinctions, of an 
access to the public sphere which was forbidden to traditional women 
as a space of action and the constitution of individual autonomy»10.
“Lʼ affaire du foulard” eventually came to stand for all dilemmas of 
French national identity in the age of globalization and multicultural-
ism: how to retain French traditions of laïcité, republican equality and 
democratic citizenship in view of France sʼ integration into the Euro-
pean Union on the one hand and the pressures of multiculturalism ge-
nerated through the presence of second and third generation immigrants 
from Muslim countries on French soil on the other hand? Would the 
practices and institutions of French citizenship be fl exible and gener-
ous enough to encompass multicultural differences within an ideal of 
10  Cfr. F. Gaspard-F. Khosrokhavar, Le Foulard et la Republique, pp. 44-45. My translation.
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republican equality? Among the organizations opposing the 2004
legislation to ban the wearing of the head scarf in public schools were 
the League for Human Rights, the Movement against Racism and for 
Friendship Among Peoples (MRAP), as well as the United Syndical 
Federation (FSU) and the Federation of Parents Councils (FCPE).
But what exactly was the meaning of the girls  ʼactions? Was theirs 
an act of religious observance and subversion, or one of cultural defi -
ance, or of adolescent acting out to gain attention and prominence? 
Were the girls acting out of fear, out of conviction or out of narcis-
sism? It is not hard to imagine that their actions may involve all these 
elements and motives. The girls  ʼvoices were not heard in this heated 
debate; although there was a genuine public discourse in the French 
public sphere and a soul-searching on the questions of democracy 
and difference in a multicultural society, as the sociologists Gaspard 
and Khosrokhavar pointed out, until they carried out their interviews 
and until the publication of Des Filles comme les Autres: Entretiens 
avec Alma et Lila Levy11 in 2004, the girlsʼown perspectives were 
hardly listened to. Even if the girls involved were not adults and in 
the eyes of the law and were still under the tutelage of their families, 
it is reasonable to assume that at the ages of 15 and 16, they could 
account for themselves and their actions. Had their voices been heard 
and listened to, it would have become clear that the meaning of wear-
ing the scarf itself was changing from being a religious act to one of 
cultural defi ance, increasing politicization and a vindication of cul-
tural otherness in a monochrome public space which wanted to ban 
difference to the private sphere.
There is growing evidence in the sociological literature that in 
many other parts of the world as well Muslim women are using the 
veil as well as the chador to cover up the paradoxes of their own 
emancipation from tradition12. Turkish law likewise forbids female 
students to attend universities and other institutions of higher learn-
ing with the scarf; but not only schools, other public spaces such as 
the National Assembly, must respect the principles of laiklik. Yet the 
observance of these principles can be taken to such an extreme, that 
some civil servants and municipal doctors in neighborhood clinics – 
called “dispensers” – have refused to serve women with headscarves. 
Thus, making them into the “others” of the republic in all senses of 
11  V. Giraud-Y. Sintomer, Alma et Lila Levy: Des Filles Comme les Autres, La Decouverte, 
Paris 2004. Also, A. Renaut-A. Touraine, Un Débat sur la Laïcité, Editions Stock, Paris 2005.
12  N. Gole, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor 1996.
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the term. Yet sociologists report that among girls and young women 
wearing the “foulard” in Turkey, there is conscious opposition to the 
Shariʼa in regulating private-family matters. A majority of those in-
terviewed refuse to have marriage, divorce and inheritance matters to 
be regulated by religious Islamic law and wish to preserve the Turk-
ish civil code instead. To assume, therefore, that the meaning of these 
girls  ʼactions is purely one of religious defi ance of the secular state, 
constrains these womenʼs own capacity to write the meaning of their 
own actions, and ironically, reimprisons them within the walls of pa-
triarchal meaning from which they are trying to escape.
Learning processes would have to take place and are taking place 
on the part of the Muslim girls as well: while French and Turkish 
societies would have to learn not to stigmatize and stereotype as 
“backward and oppressed creatures” all those who accept to wear 
what appears at fi rst glance to be a religiously mandated piece of 
clothing, the girls themselves and their supporters, in the Muslim 
community and elsewhere, have to learn to give a justifi cation of 
their actions with “good reasons in the public sphere”. In claiming 
respect and equal treatment for their religious beliefs, they have to 
clarify how they intend to treat the beliefs of others from different 
religions, and how, in effect, they would institutionalize the separa-
tion of religion and the state within Islamic tradition.
In todayʼs Europe, the “scarf affair” is being debated within the 
context of two fundamental principles: the equal right to freedom of 
expression, guaranteed equally to all citizens and residents on the one 
hand, and the “interests of the state” in maintaining peace, security, 
public order, etc., on the other. The clause of the separation of reli-
gion and state, while being a cornerstone of liberal democracies, also 
permits signifi cant democratic variations. Thus the United Kingdom 
has a Church of England, while Germany subsidizes the three offi -
cially recognized denominations – Protestant, Catholic and Jewish – 
through an indirect “church tax” known as “Kirchensteuer”.
The case of the German-Afghani teacher, Fereshta Ludin, also il-
lustrates some of these dilemmas. An elementary school teacher in 
Baden-Württemberg, Fereshta Ludin, of Afghani origin and German 
citizenship, insisted on being able to teach her classes with her head 
covered13. The school authorities refused to permit her to do so. The 
case ascended all the way to the German Supreme Court (BVerfGe) 
13  C. Emcke, Kollektive Identitäten. Sozialphilosophische Grundlagen, Campus, Frankfurt-
New York 2000, pp. 280-85.
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and on September 30, 2003 the Court decided as follows. «Wearing a 
headscarf, in the context presented to the Court, expresses that the 
claimant belongs to the “Muslim community of faith” (die islamische 
Religionsgemeinschaft)». The court concluded that to «describe such 
behavior as lack of qualifi cation (Eignungsmangel) for the position of 
a teacher in elementary and middle schools, clashed with the right of 
the claimant to equal access to all public offi ces in accordance with 
article 33, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), and also 
clashed with her right to freedom of conscience, as protected by article 
4, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Basic Law, without, however, providing 
the required and suffi cient lawful reasons for doing so»14. While ac-
knowledging the fundamental rights of Ms. Fereshta Ludin, the Court 
nevertheless ruled against the claimant and transferred the fi nal say on 
the matter to the democratic legislatures. «The responsible provincial 
legislature is nevertheless free to create the legal basis [to refuse to 
permit her to teach with her head covered], by determining anew with-
in the framework set by the constitution, the extent of religious articles 
to be permitted in the schools. In this process, the provincial legislature 
must take into consideration the freedom of conscience of the teacher 
as well as of the students involved, and also the right to educate their 
children on the part of parents as well as the obligation of the state to 
retain neutrality in matters of world-view and religion»15.
While acknowledging the fundamental nature of the rights in-
volved – that of freedom of conscience and equal access of all to 
public offi ces – the German Supreme Court, much like the French 
Conseil dʼEtat – refused to protect these against the will of the demo-
cratic legislatures. Yet by not delegating the case to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the school authorities, and by stressing the necessity 
for the State to maintain religious and world – view neutrality in the 
matter, it signaled to democratic law-makers the importance of re-
specting the legitimate pluralism of world-views in a liberal democ-
racy. Nevertheless, the Court did not see itself justifi ed in positively 
intervening to shield such pluralism, but considered this to be the 
domain of provincial legislation16. Such reticence may surprise some; 
undoubtedly, the fact that teachers in Germany are also “Beamten”, 
14  Cfr. German Supreme Court (BVerfGe), 2BvR, 1436/02, IVB 1 and 2. My translation.
15  Cfr. German Supreme Court (BverfGe), 2BvR, 1436/02, 6. My translation.
16  The German legislators responded to the mandate of the Court rather speedily and after 
Baden-Württemberg (Bavaria), as well passed a bill banning the wearing of headscarves in the 
schools. Christian and Jewish symbols were not included in this ban. Civil rights organizations 
and groups representing Muslims living in Germany (estimates at 3.2 million) have criticized the 
proposed ban.
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i.e. civil servants of the state who stand under the special jurisdiction 
of various civil service acts, may have played a role in the German 
Supreme Courtʼs not wanting to intervene in the regulatory jurisdic-
tional domain of legislators. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the im-
pression that the real worry of the Court was more the substantive 
rather than the procedural question, as to whether a woman who os-
tensibly wore an object representing her belonging to «the traditions 
of her community of origin» could carry out the duties and tasks of a 
functionary of the German state.
Despite the fact that Ms. Ludin was a German citizen of Afghani 
origin who had successfully completed the requisite qualifi cations to 
become a teacher according to German law, the cultural and religious 
signifi cance of her wearing the scarf clashed with widely held beliefs 
about the public face of a teacher in German society. The two dimen-
sions of her citizenship rights – the entitlement to the full protection 
of the law and her cultural identity as an observant Muslim woman 
– clashed with one another. By leaving it up to the provincial legisla-
tures to decide the extent to which articles of religious clothing and 
other items could be worn or brought into the schools, the German 
Supreme Court underlined the cultural and moral expectations of the 
parents as well as children involved. The right to freedom of con-
science, despite all acknowledgment of the stateʼs neutrality toward 
religious and other world-views, was thereby subordinated to the in-
terests of the democratic people in maintaining their specifi c cultural 
identities and traditions. The Court failed to present a robust consti-
tutional defense of pluralism. This would have involved differentiat-
ing more sharply between the status of German citizenship versus the 
cultural, ethnic and religious identity of individuals involved. Of 
course, insofar as in Germany as well as in many other liberal de-
mocracies discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, and 
religion, is unconstitutional, this formal separation is to some extent 
encoded in the law. Nevertheless, in the context of being a civil ser-
vant of the German state, a thicker and more substantive understand-
ing of citizenship-identity was invoked, and this apparently precluded 
the teacherʼs public manifestation of her belonging, not just to any 
religion, but to Islam17.
17  Emcke points out that in an earlier decision concerning the presence of crucifi xes in the 
classroom, what the German Supreme Court declared to be unconstitutional was not the existence 
of religious symbols in public spaces or public schools, but rather the obligation to display the 
crucifi x regularly. «In this sense – she concludes – there are no constitutional grounds against 
religious symbols as such» (cfr. C. Emcke, Kollektive Identitäten. Sozialphilosophische Grundla-
gen, p. 284).
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In clear recognition of protections provided by the European Char-
ter of Human Rights as well as the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, many women from European 
countries as well as Turkey have taken this matter to the European 
Court of Human Rights. Repeatedly, the Court so far has not seen fi t 
to see the wearing of the scarf as a matter of liberty of conscience 
and has accepted that states and political bodies may have other con-
siderations in mind, such as security, in banning the wearing of the 
foulard. This is truly unfortunate.
I think the worst political mistake which can be made today in 
Europe and in many other parts of the globe is to freeze the process 
of the profound resignifi cation occurring in the lives of Muslim girls 
and women and instead to force a criminalization of their actions, 
also thereby freezing the dialectic of rights and identities which must 
be constitutive of liberal political and constitutional traditions every-
where. In conclusion, I want to return to theoretical questions again 
and introduce a framework for considering the interaction between 
rights and identities, law and democratic politics.
5. Democratic Iterations
I want to name “democratic iterations” processes in which mean-
ings, religious as well as cultural, legal as well as political, are rene-
gotiated in the public sphere of liberal democracies. These renegotia-
tions are also learning processes. “Iteration” is a term which was in-
troduced into the philosophy of language through Jacques Derridaʼs 
work. In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never sim-
ply produce a replica of the original usage and its intended meaning: 
rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration trans-
forms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways. In fact, 
there really is no “originary” source of meaning, or an “original” to 
which all subsequent forms must conform. It is obvious in the case of 
language that an act of original meaning-giving makes no sense, 
since, as Wittgenstein famously reminded us, to recognize an act of 
meaning-giving as precisely this act, we would need to possess lan-
guage itself. A patently circular notion!
Nevertheless, even if the concept of “original meaning” makes no 
sense when applied to language as such, it may not be so ill-placed 
in conjunction with documents such as laws and other institutional 
norms. Thus, every act of iteration might be assumed to refer to an 
antecedent which is taken to be authoritative. The iteration and inter-
pretation of norms, and of every aspect of the universe of value, 
94 Seyla Benhabib
however, is never merely an act of repetition. Every iteration involves 
making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different con-
text. The antecedent thereby is reposited and resignifi ed via subse-
quent usages and references. Meaning is enhanced and transformed; 
conversely, when the creative appropriation of that authoritative ori-
ginal ceases or stops making sense, then the original loses its author-
ity upon us as well. Iteration is the reappropriation of the “origin”; it 
is at the same time its dissolution as the original and its preservation 
through its continuous deployment.
Democratic iterations are linguistic, legal, cultural and political 
repetitions-in-transformation, invocations which are also revocations. 
They not only change established understandings but also transform 
what passes as the valid or established view of an authoritative pre-
cedent.
Robert Cover and following him Frank Michelman have made 
these observations fruitful in the domain of legal interpretation. In 
Nomos and Narrative Robert Cover writes:
[...] there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power 
and the organization of law as meaning. This dichotomy, manifest in folk and
underground cultures in even the most authoritarian societies, is particularly open 
to view in a liberal society that disclaims control over narrative. The uncontrolled 
character of meaning exercises a destabilizing infl uence upon power. Precepts must 
“have meaning”, but they necessarily borrow it from materials created by social 
activity that is not subject to the structures of provenance that characterize what 
we call formal lawmaking. Even when authoritative institutions try to create
meaning for the precepts they articulate, they act, in that respect, in an unprivileged 
fashion18.
The disjunction between law as power and law as meaning can be 
rendered fruitful and creative in politics through “jurisgenerative 
processes”. In such processes a democratic people, who considers 
itself bound by certain guiding norms and principles, engages in ite-
rative acts by reappropriating and reinterpreting these, thereby show-
ing itself to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws 
(Michelman). Natural right philosophies assume that the principles 
which undergird democratic politics are impervious to transformative 
acts of popular collective will. Legal positivism identifi es democratic 
legitimacy with the correctly generated legal norms of a sovereign 
18  R. M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, «Harvard Law Review», 1, 1983, pp. 4-68. See F. 
Michelman, Law sʼ Republic, «Yale Law Journal», 8, July 1988, p. 18. Emphasis added.
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legislature; by contrast, jurisgenerative politics is a model that per-
mits us to think of creative interventions that mediate between uni-
versal norms and the will of democratic majorities. The rights claims 
which frame democratic politics, on the one hand must be viewed as 
transcending the specifi c enactments of democratic majorities under 
specifi c circumstances; on the other hand, such democratic majorities 
re-iterate these principles and incorporate them into democratic will-
formation processes through argument, contestation, revision and re-
jection.
The dialectic of rights and identities are mobilized in such
processes of democratic iteration. Rights, and other principles of the 
liberal democratic state, need to be periodically challenged and reart-
iculated in the public sphere in order to retain and enrich their origi-
nal meaning. It is only when new groups claim that they belong with-
in the circles of addressees of a right from which they have been 
excluded in its initial articulation that we come to understand the 
fundamental limitedness of every right claim within a constitutional 
tradition as well as its context-transcending validity. The democratic 
dialogue, and also the legal hermeneutic one, are enhanced through 
the repositioning and rearticulation of rights in the public spheres of 
liberal democracies. The law sometimes can guide this process, in 
that legal reform may run ahead of popular consciousness and may 
raise popular consciousness to the level of the constitution; the law 
may also lag behind popular consciousness and may need to be prod-
ded along to adjust itself to it. In a vibrant liberal multicultural de-
mocracy, cultural-political confl ict and learning through confl ict 
should not be stifl ed through legal maneuvers. The democratic citi-
zens themselves have to learn the art of separation by testing the 
limits of their overlapping consensus.
Sterile, legalistic or populistic jurisgenerative processes are con-
ceivable. We may use Robert Coverʼs term «jurispathic» to refer to 
such processes. In some cases, no normative learning may take place 
at all, but only a strategic bargaining among the parties may result; in 
other cases, the political process may simply run into the sandbanks 
of legalism or the majority of the demos may trample upon the rights 
of the minority in the name of some totalizing discourse of fear and 
war. Violence may ensue. Jurisgenerative politics is not a politics of 
teleology or theodicy. Rather, it permits us to conceptualize those 
moments when a space emerges in the public sphere, when principles 
and norms which undergird democratic will formation become per-
meable and fl uid to receive new semantic contexts; and this enables 
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the augmentation of the meaning of rights. I have suggested that we 
are traversing such a moment in history when “jurisgenerative” and 
“jurispathic” politics face each other around controversies over cul-
tural difference.
